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Abstract 
The complexities of the twenty-first century have paved way for the emergence and proliferation of cross 
boundary collaboration in the lexicon of localised and territorial development. Collaborative governance is 
increasingly playing a vital role in addressing the multi-dimensional challenges of the contemporary era. 
This paper seeks to contextualise collaborative governance as a possible remedy that could help to salvage 
the incapacitated municipalities and be more resourceful in their developmental mandate of fostering local-
ised territorial development. 
In addition, the article discusses some of the contextual limitations of commonly applied state-led and civil-
powered approaches to address socio-economic problems in municipalities. To constitute a resilient collabo-
rative governance capable of improving system management and responsiveness to socio-economic issues in 
municipalities, the paper tends to shed light on the emergence of another type of approach, the hybrid-
centric collaborative approach. Given this scenario, what would be the specific roles and relationship be-
tween the state and non-state? 
Keywords: collaborative governance, Local Economic Development (LED), capacity, stakeholders, re-
sources. 
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1. Introduction 
The paradigmatic shift in development approaches as exemplified by contemporary development discourses 
confer a prominent role on localised and territorial development, otherwise known as the Local Economic 
Development (LED). These approaches involve the devolution, the delegation and decentralisation of au-
thority to lower level of government. Rodriguez-Pose (2008: 23) describes LED as an integrated approach to 
development rather than a “one size fits all” solution, with its core purpose being “to mobilise the local eco-
nomic potential by bringing innovation to all its growth dimensions which range from infrastructure, to local 
Small and Medium Enterprises and their skills, to attracting foreign direct investment, fostering territorial 
competitiveness, strengthening local institutions, better management of the development process and inter-
nalising local resources”. Bringing together local governments, the private sector and civil society in a 
search for the right LED formula allows the community to build from the ‘inside-out’, capitalizing on local 
assets rather than from the ‘outside-in’ relying on external interventions (ILO, 2008: 2, as cited in Rogerson, 
2011: 11758). The LED is multi-dimensional in nature. The perceived outcomes in LED initiatives require 
the collective initiatives of the various key stakeholders to make and/or implement multi-jurisdictional deci-
sions that cannot be addressed by unilateral action (Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh, 2012) for the common 
good of the society. Thus, LED seek the collaborative efforts of local stakeholders to grow the local econo-
mies and improve the standard of living of the local people. To this end, the government introduced the In-
tergovernmental Relations Act of 2005 with the aim of institutionalising collaboration between and among 
the three tiers of government. However, the municipalities don’t seem to be receiving adequate intergov-
ernmental supports to foster both their developmental and statutory mandates, let alone from other LED 
stakeholders. Similarly, several other collaborative tools have been introduced to coordinate LED activities 
in municipalities. These tools were based fundamentally either on the state centred approach or civil society 
driven approach. These ranges from the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) to Participatory Appraisal for 
Competitive Advantage (PACA). 
However, there are municipalities that are very successful and others that are not in LED and one wonders 
why? Despite the overwhelming proclaimed benefits of collaboration of multi-actors for local governance, 
the conditions required to ensure its efficacy are extremely difficult (Kaiser, 2011; Fedorowicz et al., 2007). 
As Huxham and Hilbert (2008: 48) correctly put it: partnering is notoriously difficult; success rates as low 
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as 20 per cent are often quoted (Huxham and Hibbert, 2008: 48). Drawing from their own personal experi-
ences, Huxham and Hilbert (2008: 48) argued that getting some sort of positive outcome was never com-
pletely straightforward. On this note, the author is quick to mention the imperativeness of having an ideal 
form of governance as evidenced in the governance structure of well constituted collaborative entity as one 
of the fundamental conditions required for collaboration to succeed. Therefore, the analytical questions that 
needs to be asked here are as follows: What specific form of collaborative governance can improve the effi-
cacy and governance of LED in municipalities. In this form of governance, what would be the specific na-
ture and role of the state, private sector and the civil society and as well as the relationship between the state, 
private sector and the civil society? 
Thus, the paper tends to aggregate and review previous literature on collaborative governance by focussing 
on the two approaches of collaborative governance, namely, the state-centric approach and the civil society 
centred approach. The civil society centred approach is a shift from the orthodox top down state-led collabo-
rative approach to one with less emphasis on government or private business leadership and more attention 
to integrating civil society actors into coordinated problem-solving oriented network. The paper goes further 
to shed more light on the emergence of yet another type of approach, the hybrid-powered collaborative ap-
proach whereby the horizontal collaboration of the civil society-led approach is promoted alongside with the 
traditional top-down facilitating command of the state and incorporating the private sector as a strategic 
partner for balanced local development. 
Through an analysis of collaborations for social innovation, the paper tends to add novel contributions to the 
scholarships that seek to break an intellectual impasse which has developed in academic discourses over the 
ideal form of governance aimed at improving system management and responsiveness to major socio-
economic issues within the municipalities, primarily, between those who believe in civil society driven ap-
proach as a preferred vehicle to address societal problems, and those who believe that the state can do it all 
alone. To this end the author articulates in the paper, a hybrid-centred approach as an emerging paradigm in 
the lexicon of collaborations for local governance, whereby the private sector, the state and the civil society 
through their respective roles and responsibilities collectively develop a common agenda, in innovating and 
designing solutions to societal problems. 
The paper is stratified into five sections. Whilst the first section forms the introduction/background of the 
paper, the second section presents the LED context in South Africa, whereby the background of LED and 
the various challenges confronting the operationalisation of LED in South Africa are being discussed. The 
IGRF as a capacity building tool is presented in section three. The author conceptualises in section four, 
collaborative governance for LED as a collective endeavour for multi stakeholders to evolve a common 
agenda to address societal development issues within the municipalities. Through the lenses of state and 
society-led perspectives, the author presents the discussions on an emerging hybrid-powered approach of 
collaborative governance and a hypothetical case of the approach in the same section four. Finally, the paper 
is drawn to a conclusion in section five. 
2. LED in South African contexts 
This aspect of the paper focuses on LED in South Africa with special reference to its background and chal-
lenges as presented in sub-headings 2.1 and 2.2. 
2.1. Background 
There are 278 municipalities in South Africa, comprising 8 metropolitans, 44 districts and 226 local munici-
palities. They all focussed on growing local economies and providing infrastructure and services. In the 
South African context, LED usually refers to actions initiated at the local level, typically by a combination 
of partners, to address socio-economic problems or to respond to economic opportunities (HSRC, 2003: 12). 
As pointed out by Patterson (2008: 1) Local economic development in South Africa is a post 1994 phenom-
enon. Under apartheid, South Africa had a distinct regional planning policy characterised by strong central 
government control which suppressed the emergence of LED initiatives in towns and cities of South Africa 
and lead to the erosion of local autonomy. In facilitating a response to the multi-faceted development chal-
lenges which the country faces, South Africa’s African National Congress government has initiated a verita-
ble battery of policies to promote reconciliation, decentralisation, local empowerment, participation and 
development at the local government level (Binns, Porter, Nel and Kyei, 2005: 27). 
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According to Sections 152 (c) and 153 (a) of the constitution, local government must “promote social and 
economic development” and it must “structure and manage its administration, and budgeting and planning 
processes to give priority to the basic needs of the community, and to promote the social and economic de-
velopment of the community” (RSA, 1996). Moreover, the South African constitution establishes “devel-
opmental local government” which implies that the LED agenda in the context of South Africa, unlike in 
other countries is neither voluntary nor just a local government initiative but a constitutional requirement 
(Hofisi, Mbeba, Maredza and Choga (2013: 539). To this end, Smith and Vawda (2003: 28) asserts that the 
idea of developmental local government (DLG) emerged from the fusion of the social interventionist goals 
of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and the market-driven economic strategies of the 
Growth Employment and Redistribution policy (GEAR); the two main national policies of the post-
apartheid era for addressing economic growth and poverty eradication. 
The (RDP) was a policy framework for integrated and coherent socio-economic progress and it sought to 
mobilise all the people of South Africa and the country’s resources toward the final eradication of the results 
of apartheid (RSA, 1996). The GEAR on the other hand was a strategy for rebuilding and restructuring the 
economy of South Africa in keeping up with the goals set in the RDP (RSA, 1996). The objectives of GEAR 
were to provide basic services to the poor, to alleviate poverty, achieve economic growth, reduce national 
debt, stabilise inflation and give effect to the socio-economic rights in the Constitution (Visser, 2004; City 
of Cape Town, 2004: no pagination). GEAR did not completely depart from earlier government policy but 
committed government to accelerating aspects of existing policy, albeit with a very significant compromise 
to the neo-liberal policy (City of Cape, 2004: no pagination). 
As contested by Gilbert (2002) neo-liberal ideas has been dominant within ANC, even before the adoption 
of RDP. The strategy of GEAR focussed on neo-liberal, free market economy whereby special attention was 
accorded to macroeconomic stabilization as well trade and financial liberation to foster economic growth, 
increased employment and reduce poverty. Given this strategy, the government implemented batteries of 
neo-liberal measures, such as fiscal austerity, deregulation, export oriented development and privatisation, 
culminating into a distinct withdrawal of the state and a transfer of competence to the private sector, where-
by areas previously the competence of the state, such as State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) were included 
under a capitalist mode of production (Narsiah, 2002: 3) 
To this end several institutional arrangements were instituted to facilitate closer ties with the private sector. 
In 1998, the municipal infrastructure investment unit was established to facilitate the inflow of private capi-
tal into the provision of basic services. Similarly, the same period under review, witnessed the emergence of 
the Municipal Systems Act, Municipal Structures Act and a host of enabling documents pertaining to public-
private partnerships which created the enabling environment for an increasing role of the private sector in 
the provision of public services in South African municipalities. Thus, the country has played host to the 
proliferation of public services outsourcing and different concessions of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) 
schemes in South African municipalities. In addition, privatisation has been of wider scale throughout the 
country. Thus, Narsiah (2002: 7) lamented that these initiatives were powered under the cloak of black-
empowerment and entrepreneurialism. 
Regrettably, these so-called local partnerships were controlled by multi-national corporations. Thereby cre-
ating a situation that the Author would like to describe as adding salt to injury, whereby the level of poverty 
becomes deepened and a widened gap of inequality ensued. Put in differently, the implications were far-
reaching indeed as thousands of jobs were at stake amidst increasingly widening inequality and slow pace of 
addressing poverty and other dimensions of well-being in the society. This is being evidenced in the wide 
spread of protests and manifestations in black township in the country. 
Therefore, the Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa (ASGISA) was promulgated in 2005 
with the aims of improving policy implementation and economic growth by dealing with the challenges of 
lack of skilled and committed staff in the public service, inadequate financial resources, corruption and 
mismanagement of funds and lack of people-driven development. The plan promised to increase the growth 
rate to an annual average of 6% by 2010, and to halve unemployment and poverty by 2014. As argued by 
Blumenfeld (2015) the failure of the ASGISA to stimulate faster growth created lack of credibility for this 
ambitious plan. 
It’s interesting to mention that the current South African neo-liberal economic strategy on growth and pov-
erty are based on two strategy documents. In 2010, the South African government adopted yet another ambi-
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tious neo-liberal macro-economic strategy known as the New Growth path (NGP), followed by the National 
Development plan (NDP) established in 2013. The NDP was developed by the national planning commis-
sion in the presidency, while the NGP by economic cluster under the leadership of Minister for Economic 
Development Ephraim Patel. Whilst the aims of the NDP is to ensure that all South Africans attain a decent 
wellbeing through the elimination of poverty and reduction of inequality (NPC, 2011), the NGP is intended 
to facilitate a restructuring of the south African economy to improve its performance in terms of labour ab-
sorption as well as the composition and rate of growth (Economic Development Department, 2011). 
As correctly argued by Hendriks (2012: no pagination) these two strategies articulate strong developmental 
orientation, but the mechanism they envisage for achieving them are quite distinct. As the NDP seek to re-
duce poverty, unemployment and inequality, the NGP tends to enhance growth and create employment. 
Arguably, it be seen that though both the NDP and the NGP are oriented to the establishment of a develop-
mental state as the key to overcoming inequality, their ideologies are dichotomous. The NDP is preoccupied 
with state powered approach of driving change through state intervention, investment and societal transfor-
mation. The state disposition on NDP was articulately argued by Hendriks (2012: no pagination) that the 
NDP focuses on advancing the developmental state by relying heavily on public resources to achieve its 
goals of service delivery and typically making the market share of previously disadvantage people a top 
priority above sustainability, efficiency, and profitability (Consultancy Africa Intelligence, 2012). The NGP, 
on the other hand, supports a more flexible monetary policy to enhance domestic demand and recognises that 
investments in poverty reduction, job creation and economic growth need strong social commitment and partner-
ships and cannot rely solely on public resources (Hendriks, 2012). However, the NGP has its own wit ends. 
According to economic analysts, the policy has been levelled some criticism just as its predecessor neo-
liberal economic policies, the GEAR and the ASGISA economic policies, neither of which made a signifi-
cant impact on economic development in South Africa. 
Undoubtedly the continued hunt for all encompassing development policy provides the impetus for the 
emergence of the developmental concept of local government. Building upon the strategies of the RDP, 
‘developmental local government’ is charged amongst other things with the achievement of local economic 
development, whereby the local government is conferred with the onerous roles and responsibilities of creat-
ing enabling environment for job creations and boosting the local economy through the provision of busi-
ness-friendly services, local procurement, investment promotion, support for small businesses and growth 
sectors (Binns, Porter, Nel, and Kyei, 2005: 28). Thus, LED strategies are adjudged as having key roles to 
play in the alleviation of poverty and reduction of inequality in post-apartheid South Africa (African Na-
tional Congress 1994; Nel and Binns, 2002: 8). 
Therefore, local economic development policy and practice has evolved significantly in the post-apartheid 
era in South Africa (Nel and Binns, 2001: 355). According to Moyo (2007: 222) many strategies have been 
developed and are already being implemented through many LED initiatives. The strategies are defined 
largely in terms of a market-approach with the private sector playing a key role and municipalities working 
as facilitators. Evidently, Nel and Rogerson (2005: 17) argues that municipalities are applying a range of 
interventions in their local areas, some of which are distinctively pro-growth in focus, while others have a 
clear pro-poor emphasis. For most municipalities, the initial LED practice was confined to small projects, 
many of which were survivalist type initiatives in the form of community economic development projects, 
the majority of which proved unsustainable once donor or public-sector funding disappeared, and with no 
real impact on poverty reduction (Cohen, 2010; Rogerson, 2010). Evidently, the Development Bank South-
ern Africa (2008: 2) records reveals that the focus of most municipal LED initiatives in South Africa has 
been on Micro-level projects with the result that LED “lost currency as an effective sustainable development 
tool. In addition, Hindson (2003: 4) argues that the results have generally been disappointing with capacity 
and resource constraints being the key hindrances in many local authority areas (Nel, 2001 as cited in Nel 
and Rogerson, 2003: 8) 
2.2. Challenges 
According to Rogerson (2010: 489) the limited success of LED projects with a welfare focus has under-
mined the credibility and significance attached to LED by many local authorities. In South Africa, national 
policies, as pursued by the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) and the Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI), are based on conflicting paradigms and have been pulling in different directions. 
Whilst the pro-poor agenda of the DPLG seek to influence the allocative process to benefit the poor through 
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investment in infrastructures and businesses which are likely to benefit the poor, the DTI is primarily seek-
ing on how to make capital more productive to enhance economic prosperity. Most policy papers are charac-
terised by this tension between those two paradigms and try to bridge these tensions in various ways (Patter-
son, 2008: 4). Although these two approaches are complementary, the key policy issue is of defining the 
weight and balance of support to be allocated between them (Lambshead, 2007, as cited in Rogerson, 2010: 
312). Similarly, Hofisi, Mbeba, Maredza and Choga (2013: 593) also argue that the conceptualisation of 
LED is theoretically unclear and underdeveloped, thus this further erodes the capacity of municipalities to 
successfully conceptualise and implement strategies for LED. 
It has been argued in most literatures (Hindson, 2003; Nel, 2001; Rogerson, 2010) that the disappointing 
LED results in South Africa can be attributable to resource and capacity constraints compounded by limited 
experience of local government in terms of promoting economic development. In addition, Rogerson (2010) 
identifies some of the strategic challenges bedevilling LED implementation in South Africa as: lack of ca-
pacity at local government level; lack of funding for LED; ineffective LED methodologies for planning; 
poor coordination of networks. 
As Maserumele (2008: 440) had stated, contemporary studies show that most municipalities in South Africa 
do not fare well in their attempt to assert themselves as developmental local government. This limited per-
ceived success of LED in South Africa has meant that its career path lacks credibility, with the consequence 
that it is associated with low-level staffing and high turnover, especially outside the larger metropolitan are-
as and cities. Therefore, the practice of LED in many municipalities becomes either a ‘dumping ground’ for 
ineffective officials or only a stepping stone for competent local government personnel because of LED’s 
constrained career prospect (Rogerson, 2010). 
Given the result on the empirical studies on municipalities’ skill challenge for accelerated service delivery in 
South Africa, some scholars (Maserumule, 2008; Kanye, 2006; Davids and Esau, 2012), argue that munici-
palities in South Africa are generally in crisis which is a clear case of capacity gap and this impact on their 
ability to fulfil constitutional mandate in many respects. Thus, emerging as a contributing factor to the 
waves of service delivery protests in blacks and coloured townships in South Africa (Legassick, 2010, and 
Good Governance Learning Network, 2008: 84). 
To this end Rogerson (2009) argue that municipalities are therefore faced with the challenges of developing 
the capacity required to improve its performance towards the achievement of its developmental mandate. To 
bridge capacity gaps, the South African government has introduced the Intergovernmental Relations Act 
(IGRA) of 2005, which provides a framework on how to shore up and build capacity at local level by institu-
tionalising cooperative governance between and among the three tiers of government, namely, the National, 
provincial and local government. 
3. The Intergovernmental Relation Framework (IGRF) as a capacity building tool for LED 
Given the IGRF, various roles and responsibilities have been assigned to the national, provincial and district 
municipalities on matters of supporting and building capacity for local municipalities to carry out its consti-
tutional mandate of service delivery and LED. The national government is to coordinate public policies and 
investment programme (Department of Planning and Local Government (DPLG), 2005). The provisions of 
the 2006 LED framework clarified that the function of national government was to assist and create the con-
ditions for local action to emerge and grow (DPLG, 2006). The DPLG (now Cooperative Governance and 
Traditional Affairs) has a chief directorate dedicated to LED which affords support in the following activi-
ties in the development and review of national policy, strategy and guidelines on LED: 
➢ Providing direct and hands on support to provincial and local government in selected cases; 
➢ Management and Technical Support to Nodal Economic Development Planning; 
➢ Facilitating, coordinating and monitoring of donor programmes, and 
➢ Assisting on LED capacity building processes. 
According to Patterson (2008: 16) through such interventions, the DPLG’s role is to mobilise resources, 
local role-players and interest groups ‘for the sake of achieving economic growth and creating jobs to reduce 
poverty.’  
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The 2005 LED Policy Guidelines sets forth key roles and responsibilities for the provinces and local gov-
ernment. The role of provincial government is seen as follows: 
➢ To assume a coordination role and taking responsibility for resources allocated from national to provin-
cial government and ensuring that these are correlated with the priorities of the various Integrated De-
velopment Plans (IDPs) of the municipalities. 
➢ To establish LED forums to carry out the work of the National LED Forum and establish dedicated 
LED units in provincial governments, and to assume a role in building the capacities of municipalities 
to undertake LED and in supporting them in its implementation. 
Since 2000, new roles have emerged for District Municipalities. Section 83(3) of the Structures Act de-
scribes the developmental mandate of District Municipalities, in terms of four aspects: Firstly, ensuring dis-
trict-wide integrated development planning; secondly, providing district-wide bulk services, thirdly, build-
ing the capacity of local municipalities, and lastly, promoting the equitable distribution of resources between 
local municipalities. Thus, the district municipality is charged with the responsibility of managing, co-
ordinating, implementing and monitoring various capacity building within the District and across the local 
municipalities (Davis, 2006: 9). According to Atkinson, van der Watt and Fourie (2003: 4) the role of Dis-
trict Municipalities remains very unclear. It remains to be resolved which “tier” of municipal government 
(district or local) should be the primary developmental tier, and where the important policy decisions should 
be made. It is also not clear what staff should be located at what level. As contested by Atkinson, van der 
Watt and Fourie (2003: 6) there is no hard and fast distinction between district development issues and local 
development issues and there should be a fluid and flexible involvement by District Municipalities and Local 
Municipalities, with regards to the overlapping functions. Based on the premise of the IGRF, all the three 
spheres of government, national, provincial and the municipalities, should exercise their distinctive powers, 
roles and responsibilities within principles of interdependence and interrelatedness. 
Remarkably, one of the overarching tenets that underpinned the intergovernmental relation framework is the 
types and modalities of supports that needs to be rendered to the municipalities by the national and the pro-
vincial government. However, the municipalities are not receiving the adequate intergovernmental supports 
to foster LED as found out in the study of Montingoe (2012: 216). 
Furthermore, during the course of another debate held on the 26
th of August 2010 by the South African Na-
tional Councils of Provinces titled: The role of the National Council of Provinces in Cooperative Govern-
ance and Intergovernmental relations: Unlocking the synergies for collective efforts, Nonzakazi Swartbooi, 
a representative from Kwazulu Natal province acknowledged that whilst a lot has been done to institutional-
ise co-operative governance through a framework of intergovernmental relations, the reality, however, is 
that there is a pressing need to ensure that one move beyond the legislative pronouncements (Swartbooi, 
2010: no pagination). Stemming from the same debate, however, Pravin Gordhan, the Finance Minister of 
South Africa, emphasised the need for more active engagement from provinces and local government on 
economic matters, in particular the dynamics role provinces and municipalities can play in providing eco-
nomic infrastructure and opportunities to entrepreneurs and unemployed youth (Gordhan, 2010: no pagina-
tion). Evidently, it could be deduced from the foregoing argument that though the IGRF has been developed 
to guide and propel the tiers of government in South Africa towards adopting the spirit of shared purpose 
and mutual trust to addressing socio-economic issues, ‘there are still some implementation gaps that needs 
to be addressed. At juncture, the Author is quick to add that this framework articulates the interdependence 
and interrelatedness between and among the tiers of government in South Africa, without much clarity on 
the emerging synergic relationship between government, Private sector and the Civil Society Organisation 
that is desired for a stable localised economic development. This gap provides an impetus for the emergence 
of this paper. 
Thus, the next section of this paper seeks to contextualise collaborative governance as an effective way of 
building collective and adaptive capacity that could help to improve the capacity of municipalities and 
makes make more resourceful in their developmental mandate of fostering localised territorial development. 
Therefore, the paper aggregates previous literature on Collaborative governance by focussing on the two 
approaches of collaborative governance, namely, the state centric approach and the civil society centred 
approach.  
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In addition, the paper discusses some of the contextual limitations of both approaches in its effort to collec-
tively address socio-economic problems in municipalities. To constitute a resilient collaborative governance 
capable of improving system management and responsiveness to socio-economic issues in municipalities, 
the author is prompted to shed more light on the emergence of yet another type of approach, the hybrid-
centric collaborative approach whereby the horizontal collaboration of the civil society-led approach is pro-
moted alongside with the traditional top-down facilitating command of the state and incorporating the pri-
vate sector as a strategic partner for balanced local development. Given this scenario, the question is: What 
would be the specific nature, role of the state, private sector and the civil society and as well as the relation-
ship between the state, private sector and the civil society in the emerging hybrid approach? 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In the fourth section, the Author contextualise collabo-
rative governance whereby the author provide a brief review of various antecedents’ theoretical framework 
on collaborative governance in terms of how to build an adaptive capacity for LED by focussing on the two 
approaches of collaborative governance, namely, the state centric approach and the civil society centred 
approach. Thereafter, the section contextualise the advocated hybrid-powered approach of collaborative 
governance and the roles of the actors, namely, the State, Civil society organisation and the private sector. A 
case of good practice of cooperative governance in South Africa is being discussed in the section and a con-
clusion to the paper is drawn in section five. 
4. Contextualising collaborative governance for LED 
LED is concerned with local people working together to achieve sustainable economic growth that brings 
economic benefits and quality of life and improvements for all in the community (World Bank, 2003). Ac-
cording to Meyer (2015: 632) the potential dynamic driving force behind LED initiatives is partnership for-
mation by local stakeholders. It has been argued that local developmental projects driven by local business 
and local communities have more chance to succeed than projects attempted by government alone. In the 
same token, Clarke and Moir (2014, as cited in Cloete, 2015: 4) echoed that economic development should 
be orchestrated as a partnership activity between public, private and institutional sectors, with substantial 
vertical and horizontal collaboration on the public side. 
Thus, it can be argued that the evolving complex issues in development management in the twenty-first 
century have paved way for the proliferation of cross boundary collaboration, whereby multiple levels of 
government, NGOs, associations and clients work together in search for knowledge and solutions designed 
to solve problems that go beyond one organisation (Agranoff and Mcquire, 2003: 16). 
According to Ansell and Gash (2008) Collaborative governance is described as the engagement of public 
agencies and non-state holders in collective decision making. The principal objective of collaborative gov-
ernance is to build collective capacity (Agranoff, 2006) for multi-level or multi scalar stakeholders – private, 
civic/non-governmental and public sphere, through the process of deliberation (Fishkin, 2009; Innes and 
Booher, 2010) and principled negotiation (Fisher, Ury and Patton, 2011) to make and/or implement multi-
jurisdictional decision that cannot be addressed by unilateral action (Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh, 2012) 
or the common good of the society (Agbodzakey 2015; Edigheji, 2010; Zurba, 2014; Bingham and  
O’ Leary, 2008; Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015). However, the theory and practice of collaborative governance 
for localised economy seems to be rudimentary in South Africa. 
According to Cloete (2015: 14) the interaction among the traditional economic stakeholders in South Africa, 
namely, the government, private sector and labour, is historically adversarial and currently, private sector 
view government with increased suspicions and disillusionment. 
In contextualizing collaborative governance for LED, the researcher is primarily concerned with the ability 
of the collaborative governance regime to produce adaptive capacity to adjust responses to changing contex-
tual drivers and internal processes, and to allow for development along the stability domain, as well as hav-
ing the ability to be transformed into new developmental pathway, in a sustainable way. To put simply, the 
ability to enhance capacities within municipalities to be more resourceful, efficient and sustainably delivery 
on their developmental mandates. Stemming from the urban and regional development perspectives, several 
scholars have conceptualised adaptive capacity as the ability of communities to withstand external shocks to 
their social infrastructure (Agder, 2000); the way in which people adapt to changing circumstances to sus-
tain themselves through self-governing initiative (Katz, 2004); and the capacity of humans to anticipate 
change and influence future pathways (Omagano Shoola, 2016: online). 
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Such adaptive capacity as mentioned in several literatures, can evolve as a result of the following benefits 
associated with collaborative/cooperative governance: improved and enhanced coordination of activities, 
better leverage and pooling of resources, increased social capital, enhanced conflict management, better 
knowledge management (including, translation and diffusion), increased risk sharing in policy experimenta-
tion (Agranoff, 2007; Agranof and Mcquire, 2003; Leach and Sabatier, 2005; Provan and Milward, 1995). 
Thus, Dawley et al. (2010); Simmie and Martin (2010) as cited in Mackinnon and Derickson 2012: 261) 
echoed the imperativeness of regional institutions’ role to foster adaptive capacity as an underpinning factor 
to the development of successful regions such as Cambridge. As correctly argued by Wolfe (2010: 145), 
‘Successful regions must be able to engage in strategic planning exercises that identify and cultivate their 
resources, undertake collaborative processes to plan and implement change and encourage a regional mind-
set that fosters growth. Therefore, the key theme in focus in this context is mostly on the importance of 
agency having the adaptive capacity and strategic leadership acumen in framing and responding to crises 
and challenges. However, the question is: Do the state organ alone has this adaptive capacity to respond to 
changes and uncertainties in the society? 
Thus, the tasks of creating such adaptive capacity capable of improving the system management and respon-
siveness to major social and economic issues within the municipalities, is a process that requires the collec-
tive efforts of trio actors, namely, the state, private sector and the civil society organization. However, the 
ensuing questions are: Under this dispensation, what is the nature, the role and the relationship between and 
among the state, the private sector and the civil society organizations? What specific form of collaborative 
governance can improve the efficacy and governance of LED in municipalities? 
In the past decade a number of alternative theoretical framework for collaboration have been proposed by 
different scholars: Design and Implementation of Cross-Sector Collaborations (Bryson, Crosby, and Stone, 
2006); Collaboration Processes (Thomson and Perry, 2006); Collaborative Governance (Ansell and Gash, 
2008); Managing within Networks (Agranoff, 2007); Collaborating to Manage (Agranoff, 2012), Modes of 
Network Governance (Provan and Kenis, 2008); Integrative framework for collaborative governance (Emer-
son, Nabatchi and Balogh, 2012) and Communicative Framework of Value in Cross-Sector Partnerships 
(Koschmann, Kuhn, and Pfarre, 2012). These frameworks have much in common, but they differ in im-
portant ways (Bryson, Crosby and Stone, 2015: 4). Collectively they show commonalities of collaborative 
governance in terms of portraying the various contextual matters present within the environment (system 
context) that could influence it outcomes; the dynamic collaborative process within the context that consti-
tute the collaborative Governance regime and the desired outcomes emanating from the collaborative pro-
cess capable of enhancing the capacity or capability of each and every parties to the collaborative govern-
ance regime to achieve a common purpose. As contained in the integrative framework of Emerson, Nabatchi 
and Balogh (2012), these contextual issues that influences collaboration level and outcomes include: Proce-
dural and institutional arrangement in terms of the procedures and organisational structures required to man-
age the iterative reaction over time; the Leadership roles required either at the start of the collaboration or 
during the process of collaboration to steer it through to implementation (Bryson, Crosby, and Stone, 2006); 
the knowledge and the resources capacity acquired through resources leverage. As correctly argued by 
Agranoff (2008: 165), the term knowledge in this context refers to the social capital of shared knowledge 
that has been weighed, processed, and integrated with the values and judgments of all participants. Stem-
ming from the application of these frameworks in practice as synthesised by the author, two overarching 
models evolves, namely, the state- centric model and the society-centric model (Clarke, 2016). 
State centric-model 
In state-centric models, the success of collaborative endeavours hinges on the state whereby the public man-
agers are central to negotiating, initiating, and funding collaborative arrangements. The public managers are 
bestowed with the formal power and authority to deliberate, to reach consensus, to arbitrate conflicts, to set 
rules, and to commit state power, authority, and resources to joint action. According to Clarke (2016), with 
the absence of these acts, state-centric collaboratives would not exist. Having taken due cognisance of the 
pivotal role of the state towards the success of collaborative process in a state-centric model, in order to 
determine the ability of such collaborative to enhance the system management of development policies at 
local level, one is prompted to ask the following analytical questions: To what extent do these processes 
promote democratic accountability, deliberative capacity, or inclusive citizen participation? How do these 
processes shape the perception of the participants about the legitimacy of the government and its policy? To 
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what degree do participants have true equality in terms of participation, power, and authority during the 
processes? The answers to these questions are not far- fetched. It has been evidently contested that these 
processes vary on many salient dimensions, including the degree to which they include the general public, 
promote genuine deliberation, foster relational or rational discourse and have a tangible outcome (Fung and 
Wright, 2001; Torres, 2003; Williamson, 2004; Bingham, Leary and Nabatchi, 2004). According to 
Coglianese, Kilmartin and Mendelson (2009) agencies tend to solicit public input through the notice-and-
comment process of informal rulemaking, rather than through democratic deliberation. In addition, it can be 
argued that under state-centric configuration, the government’s actions are severally challenged. Given the 
wide-ranging and potentially conflicting roles a government fulfils, as correctly argued by Yamak and Suer 
(2005) there is the possibility of significant ethical and practical problems that potentially undermines the 
government position as stakeholder in a collective endeavour. It has been argued that the political and insti-
tutional context in which state-led collaborative operates present as many difficulties as privileges. These 
amongst other things include capacity constraints, divergent policies and priorities and fiscal volatility. Sim-
ilarly, Clarke (2016) contests that public officials operate in a context of over lapping jurisdictions whereby 
power is shared and with fragmented authority constrains by weak fiscal policy. As prospects for collabora-
tive problem solving are constrained by these contextual limits on their formal powers, the author is prompt-
ed to ask: How can public administrators fulfil the mandate to engage citizens and stakeholders in ways that 
enhance the legitimacy of governance? What are the forms and best practices for citizens and stakeholders 
to participate in the local governance? The answer to these questions could be seen in the later part of the 
paper presented under the emerging hybrid-centric model of governance. 
Society-centric model 
The emergence of the society centred approach was enthusiastically heralded as a shift from the orthodox 
top down state-led collaborative approach to one with less emphasis on government or private business 
leadership and more attention to integrating civil society actors into coordinated problem-solving oriented 
network. 
From the society-centred approach, collaborative governance is adjudged to be concerned with the role of 
civil society, the nature of civil society in terms of how it can be mobilized, structured and the relationship 
between civil society and the state. 
As pointed out by Clarke (2016) in this approach, although government agencies and some businesses are 
often involved as partners, and often provide funding, they are unlikely to initiate or direct these society-
based collaborative efforts. Clarke added that the society-centred collaborative is characterised with the 
involvement of multiplicity of cross-sectoral actor which articulates broad civic purposes or a common 
agenda, mobilize for joint work, and coordinate implementation of project-specific activities that cannot be 
achieved unilaterally by any one organization. It has been argued that collaborative endeavours powered by 
society-centric model often have very informal structure and functioning (Desse, 2012: 10) and in most cas-
es tends to address social issues that rarely attain the agenda status of economic development prospects. 
Another drawback that has been levelled against this type of model could be seen considering transparency 
and accountability. According to Desse (2012: 10) the CSOs are not very transparent and accountable, espe-
cially when it comes to financial matters and internal transparency. To this end, the author is quick to em-
phasise here that transparency and accountability are so imperative to the efficiency and effectiveness of any 
collaborative endeavour, especially when it comes to the building of mutual trust 
To this end, Cross (undated) as cited in Selmeczi (2015: 55) claim that the political concerns of the civic 
organizations (“the civics,” as they are commonly referred to) prevent them from successfully partaking in 
community development as they fail to grasp the subtle dynamics operating in poor segments of the society. 
Cross argued that although the civic now offers their services as development intermediaries, the civics are 
not suitable for instilling a common sense of nationality and internalised sense of order. This assertion 
seems to subject civic to a relegation bench as it tends to question the reputation and legitimacy of the civic 
organisation in its statutory roles of supporting poverty reduction by helping citizen and pressurizing gov-
ernment and state institutions for social accountability and responsiveness. 
Similarly, Banulescu-Bogdan (2011) pointed out the problems of coordination, lack of political integration 
and institutionalization often faced by civil organisations. 
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Following these backdrops, the continued search for a cut-edging approach remain unabated. This provides 
an impetus or the rationale for the author of this paper to advance the use of yet another type of approach 
called the Hybrid approach as discussed below. 
Hybrid-centred approach of Collaborative Governance: Roles of the State, CSO and the Private sector 
Stakeholders in the hybrid domain has the interest and the willingness to go beyond their conventional 
knowledge to identify sustainable solutions for social missions (Aoyama and Parthasarathy, 2017: no pagi-
nation). 
The hybrid-centred approach of collaborative is a new paradigm shift from seeing governance as the exclu-
sive sanctuary of the government or the civil society, but as an all-encompassing governance that incorpo-
rates the contributions of the civil society and the private sector alike. The principal characteristics of a well-
functioning developmental state is a healthy relationship between the private sector, government and civil 
society. The performance efficiency of the trio is required to sustain balanced localised economic develop-
ment (Essia, 2015). Stemming from the hybrid powered approach of collaborative governance, whilst the 
state maintains its orthodox roles of creating the enabling environment for the functioning of the entire sys-
tems, and all activities (Dohan, Doh and Raelin, 2014: 665; Buchholz and Rosenthal, 2004) the private sec-
tor generates jobs and income and the civil society facilitates sound service delivery and mobilises people 
and group to participate effectively in development. In addition, the civil society supports poverty reduction 
by helping the citizen to empower themselves and pressurizing government and the private sector institu-
tions for local accountability and public finance management (Essia, 2015: 2). Given this scenario, the gov-
ernment cannot benefit from a special status or privileges enabling it to force the actors to conform to its 
expectations. 
Therefore, the actors as contested by Dahan, Doh and Raelin, 2014: 665) are at liberty to treat the govern-
ment just as well as any other of its stakeholders. Though governments can still play its advocating roles for 
other stakeholders (Friedman and Miles, 2002). Given the perspective of Donahue and Zeckhauser (2011: 
32) collaboration is a system whereby the government relies on private actors whom it motivates, influ-
ences, and constrains, but does not fully control. This incomplete control is deliberately acknowledged as a 
prerequisite to high performance of collaborative endeavours. Interestingly, the role of the private sector on 
the host communities in this new approach is closely link with the state and non-state and can be seen 
through the lenses of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to measure their corporate performance. 
In furtherance, strategic management underscores the importance of managers working with elected officials 
and the political environment, as well as with other external stakeholders, to develop and enact policy. Simi-
larly, the proponents (Aoyama and Parthasarathy, 2016; Galli and Fishers, 2016) of hybrid powered govern-
ance seek for new governance processes that promotes increased collaboration among government, private 
sector, civil society, and citizens. The type of collaboration that enhance democratic decision making; and 
promote decisional legitimacy, consensus, citizen engagement, public dialogue, reasoned debate, higher 
decision quality, and fairness among an active and informed citizenry. 
Imperatively, the hybrid approach is capable of evolving solutions that promote continued engagement and 
require joint responsibility for implementation, monitoring, and revision, unlike the traditional state centred 
and society centred approach that deny parties responsibility and encourage them to disengage after a single 
interaction. In addition, such desired collaboration promotes and maintain accountability for collective deci-
sions; advance political equality while educating citizens; foster a better understanding of competing inter-
ests while contributing to citizens’ moral development; and orient an atomized citizenry toward the collec-
tive action (Bingham, Nabatchi and Leary, 2004: 554). 
Another important feature of a hybrid approach is the process of negotiation. Though there could be a cer-
tain degree of adversarialism of stakeholder’s relationship due to their differing interests, interestingly, hy-
brid approach enhances a fundamental trade-off in values and objectives for mutual benefits. Thus, negotia-
tion in a hybrid approach tend to occur among parties that need each other and cannot entirely impose their 
will onto the other, same as in the case of public–private partnerships (Akintoye et al., 2003; Dahan, Doh 
and Raelin, 2014: 667) and cross-sector collaborations (Eggers and Macmillian, 2013); Selsky and Parker, 
2005). In terms of their decision making, the decision processes may vary from adopting an agenda to taking 
some action. However, decisions emerge because of shared learning experiences in which the product is the 
creative solution that emanates from the discussion (Bingham, Nabatchi and Leary, 2004: 549). Finally, the 
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effective participation of the various actors should provide checks and balance against corruption and pro-
mote accountability and transparency of local official (Brillantes and Fernandez, 2011: 23). Actors in this 
type of approach are interdependence and accountable to each other. Stemming from this approach, some of 
the orthodox functions and responsibilities performed by the state to promote accountability may ultimately 
be performed by independent auditors, public interest groups, standard-setting organisation, and workplace 
and community group might oversee rule implementation and evaluate compliance (Freeman, 2011: 14). 
It has been argued that the success of collaboration is a function of the system context within the environ-
ment and the dynamic process of the collaboration itself within the context. Stemming from the scope of this 
paper, the contextual factors presented here are confined to the resources required to support and reinforce 
the collaborative regime and as well as the legal framework present in the environment to promote collabo-
ration. The parameters (process element) for the dynamic collaboration process are being curtailed to the 
participant/representation, process design and content of the collaborative process. To this end, the paper 
tends to present a normative framework on the roles of the various actors in a hybrid powered approach of 
collaboration as shown in Table 1 in the Appendix. 
Given the table below, it reveals the universality of responsibility of all the actors in hybrid powered collab-
oration to provide the requisite resources to support the collaborative regime. These resources include but 
not limited to funds, time, technical knowledge and information. In formulating the contextual legal frame-
work, the state is required to grant some discretions to the private sector and the civil society. However, 
under this scenario the state should neither be seen as an umpire or a pushover, rather, the trio actors needs 
to be involved in setting common agenda based on equal footings. Similarly, the roles of the various actors 
during the collaborative process are articulately reported in the table, all the actors in the collaboration takes 
full ownership and responsibility for selection of participants, as well as the process and content design of 
the collaboration process. 
An additional column is added which tends to articulate the parameters that could be taken into considera-
tion so as to enhance accountability among the various actors. As contained in the table, in order to promote 
responsiveness and accountability among the actors in terms of resources provision, there needs to be a 
mechanism in place for rewarding and incentivising actors for good performance. 
In the same vein, there needs to be clarity of laws and regulation, institutional arrangements in place to en-
hance responsiveness and accountability. As it would be improper and derogatory for actors to be responsive 
and accountable to ambiguous laws and regulation, especially where there is lack of discernible institutional 
arrangements in place. 
Lastly, it can be argued that the expertise of representatives in a collaborative process tends to infuse some 
sense of legitimacy and credibility into the deliberative process. Interestingly, such legitimacy and 
credibility goes a long way to promote mutual trust that could enhance responsiveness and accountability 
among the interdependent actors to each other. 
An example of a good practice of Hybrid-centred Collaboration in South Africa (The Garden Route Film 
Office) 
This section seeks to review a successful case of hybrid powered collaborative initiatives in South Africa, 
“The Garden Route Film Office”. 
This is a project created to facilitate and enhance the contribution of the Film industry to the economic 
growth of the region of Western Cape in South Africa. The project was designed to market the Garden 
Route and Kleine Karoo (a suburb town in Western Cape) with its inherent beauty and natural attractions 
and wide range of locations, as a tourism, but more specifically, film destination of choice. The South Afri-
can Film Industry has seen film shoot since 2008, generating over R150 million dollars since 2003. This 
shows a huge potential for South Africa in the film industry that needs to be harnessed. The most recent 
examples of movie shoots in the Garden route includes: Klein Karoo (Movie); Hanna Hoekom (Movie-
Tsitsikamma area); Knysna (movie); Hidden City (1992-1995’s South African TV show in Hakerville) and 
the First Man (2016). 
The Garden Route Film Office is a unique regional collaboration under the auspices of the South Cape Eco-
nomic Partnership, a collaboration between local municipalities, business chambers and a broad range of 
regional Stakeholders. The South Cape Economic Partnership (SCEP) is an offshoot of the Economic De-
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velopment Partnership (EDP) initiative in Western Cape Province of South Africa. The EDP, an independ-
ent, multi- sector, non-profit, public benefit organisation was established in 2012 as a collaborative interme-
diary organisation with the overarching objective of creating and sustaining partnerships between economic 
stakeholders to create a resilience, competitive region capable of providing solutions to South Africa’s so-
cio-economic challenges. The organisation emerged following agreement between approximately 130 pub-
lic, private, academic and civil society stakeholders in the regional economic delivery system (Economic 
Development Partnership n.d.) 
The EDP work with national and provincial government, state-owned entities, municipalities, business asso-
ciation, civil society organisations and universities. The case study of EDP is viewed as an exemplified hy-
brid model of collaborative governance whereby the governing board membership of the organisation is 
composed of both public and private sector. As the governance structure permits local knowledge of busi-
ness issues to direct the organisation’s efforts, imperatively, the partnership benefits in various ways from 
the local knowledge provided by the business community through its representative on the board, without 
jeopardizing the increasing role of the civil organisation as key stakeholders working in conjunction with the 
state. 
The EDP budget largely consist of funds derived from the government. However, the organization is 
striving towards reducing its reliance on public funding and increasing its financial support from the private 
sector. This could be achieved through, private sector sponsorships and corporate partnerships. Notably, the 
EDP has been involved in identifying and formulating new partnering methodologies, galvanising the 
relations between the various partners, and designing and sustaining enabling platform aimed at improving 
the system management and responsiveness to major socio-economic issues in the municipalities. As 
epitomised by the notable outcomes of the Garden Route film strategy, the EDP played a unique role in 
bringing together different stakeholders, the public sector, the private sector, academia and civil society to 
focus on specific local issues that had been identified as key drivers of economic growth in the 
municipalities. Thus, the unique advantage of having private sector representatives among the governing 
board of the organisation allows the EDP to be closely connected to the business community and its needs 
and can generate strong support for the organization’s initiatives. In addition, the organisation disposition to 
private sector funding also provides the organization with increased access to resources and reduces reliance 
on public sector funding which ordinarily constrains the capacity of municipalities to delivered on its 
developmental roles. 
5. Conclusion 
The paper has presented the background of LED and cooperative governance in South Africa. Also 
presented along with the LED background, the issues of developmental local government as envisioned in the 
various neo-liberal economic approaches implemented by the ruling party in South Africa to redress the 
economic imbalances of the past and to propel the country’s economy for growth. Extant literatures on 
collaborative governance were aggregated with a special focus on two models, namely, the state- centred 
model and the society-centred model of governance. Some of the constraints faced by both models were 
discussed in the paper. Following the shortcomings of the two models as discussed in the paper, the Author 
added to the voice of those scholars advocating for more all-inclusive, democratically deliberative and 
resilient new collaborative governance approach that encompasses the government, private sectors and the 
civil society. Finally, a successful case of a hybrid-centred model of governance was equally presented in 
the paper. 
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Appendix 
 
State Private sector 
Civil society  
organization 
Accountability enhancer 
Resources 
• Public funds. • Corporate 
social responsi-
bility/ 
donations/ 
contributions. 
• Contribu-
tions/donations. 
• Rewards and incentive 
system in place. 
Legal framework 
• Setting the 
agenda; 
• Outcome ex-
pectations for 
the process. 
• Participate in 
setting common 
agenda; 
• Make input 
contributions on 
investments and 
economic 
growth. 
• Participate in set-
ting social devel-
opment goals; 
• Make input contri-
butions; 
• Sensitize and mobi-
lize the public. 
• Clarity of laws and 
regulations; 
• Institutional arrange-
ment. 
Process 
elements 
Partici-
pants/ rep-
resentation 
• Selection of 
participants; 
• Limits on par-
ticipants. 
• Participate to 
select partici-
pants and to de-
termine limits 
of participants. 
• Sensitize and mobi-
lize public partici-
pation. 
• Transparency of deci-
sion making; 
• Democracy of deci-
sion making process; 
• Effort to communicate 
with stakeholders in 
decision making. 
Process 
design 
• Ownership of 
the process; 
• Interaction 
expectations for 
the process; 
• Number, length 
and location of 
meetings. 
• Co-ownership 
of the process; 
• Setting com-
mon agenda on 
the numbers, 
length and loca-
tions of meet-
ings. 
• Co-ownership of 
the process; 
• Setting common 
agenda on the 
numbers, length 
and locations of 
meetings. 
• Clear description of 
tasks and responsibility; 
• Expertise of repre-
sentative. 
Content 
• Setting the 
agenda; 
• Outcome and 
expectations for 
the process. 
• Participate in 
setting goals on 
investments and 
macro-
economic 
growth and sus-
tainability. 
• Participate in set-
ting goals on ad-
dressing social is-
sues of crimes, un-
employment and 
poverty providing 
input to agenda-
setting and policy 
development pro-
cesses. 
• Clear description of 
tasks and responsibility; 
• Expertise of repre-
sentative. 
Table 1. Roles of stakeholders in a hybrid powered collaborative governance 
 
